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The paper will first review dilerrrnas posed by intrinsic irrperfections of any financial market, and will lcx:>k at legal prerequisites for the reasonably efficient operation of those markets. Then it will examine the stylized facts of sane I.atin Arrerican experirrents in financial liberalization, particularly those carried out in Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) . Finally, alternative ways of organizing darestic capital markets under I.atin American conditions will be discussed; policies regarding the links between domestic and international financial markets will also be considered.
II. PECULIARITIES AND DILEMMAS FOUND IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Are banks special, and really all that different from butcher shops?
. -···-·· ,: ...
Neither type of firm is exactly like the textbook idealization of the atanistic firm operating in a perfectly canpetitive narket, where spot prices surmarize all information relevant for buyers and sellers of -2-the product. Custarers at a butcher shop will not only lCXJk at price, but will also attempt to ascertain quality; in sare countries they will be aided by governrrent-established quality categories and certifications.
Breakdowns in the trust consumers have on their butchers or on governrrent certification, say because of nnrors regarding neat tainted by poisonous substances,~ could produce a kind of "run" on butcher shops, and widespread failures anong them.
The caaparison is surely being forced. A butcher will seldom turn down a custarer who wants to buy with cash everything in sight at the price announced by the butcher (he will just make sure the cash is not counterfeit); a banker will surely not lend all a custcner wants to borrCM at the going interest rate. The fonrer is a spot transaction; the latter involves a pranise to repay in the future which may or may not be sincere or wholly credible. Enforcing the loan contract will involve costs, and even with speedy enforcenent the bank may be unable to get all of its m::>ney back. The bank will incur costs to explore the creditworthiness of borrowers; the butcher will not care much for the reputation of cash-carrying custarers. There is no humanly possible way of devising a fail-proof system of finding out the true intentions of borrowers, so lenders are likely to end up rationing credit, i.e. , putting a ceiling on what anus-length customers can borrow, regardless of their willingness to pay higher interest rates (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
Financial intenrediaries rely on borrc:Med funds; owners of those institutions typically invest their own capital only in arrounts ---. ---,:._ .
-3-which are a small fraction of their total lending. A depositor in a bank will have the preoccupations a lender has when eyeing a borrower:
will I be able to get not only the pranised yield but also my noney back as specified in the legal contract? In a totally unregulated system the rational depositor will attempt to process a great deal of information regarding financial institutions, balancing expected returns versus risks of not obtaining back his fl.mds as pranised.
One can imagine a world in which all financial int.errrediation is private and without any direct governrrent regulation. The infonnational :imperfections would be partly off set by investrcents in information gathering by lenders and depositors; with the passing of tiJre reputations would be bu~lt up. Balance sheets of financial intermediaries would be widely available and closely analyzed. It is even conceivable that possible econanies of scale involved in the processing of infonnation nay not be so large as to inpede large nurril::>ers of financial agents, assuring sorre carpetition anong them. Unexpected shocks and inf onnational failures in this econany could of course lead to bankruptcies of sane financial intenrediaries; an infonred public presumably would know the source of such events, so there would be no ripple effects contaminating sounder institutions. One would expect to find a rich risk-return rrenu available to savers in this world, which would also generate an unregulated stock rnarket for those pref erring equity arrangements for obtaining or investing funds. Concentration of econanic :r:x:;iwer, in the fonn of "econanic groups" and conglorrerates, would presurnably exist only if there are econanies of scale to yield social benefits, with free entry checking nonopoly behavior. The market rate of interest would hover around the natural rab~.
Note that even a purely laissez-faire financial system must count with sare indirect governnent inputs in the fonn of an efficient and fair judiciary and police system to punish fraud and to handle the enf orcerrent of contracts and the settlerrent of disputes and bankruptcy cases. And behind that one nu.ist presumably have a polity generating such a judicial and police system, and a body of contract, antitrust and bankruptcy laws which are regarded as fair, efficient, and enforceable. Fmancial agents feeling a tenptation to cheat on their contracts or give false infonnation IlUlSt know that such behavior will have very high costs; they nu.ist also know that even if they flee their country the long ann of the law is likely to reach them abroad. Governnents in this world nu.ist be expected not to change nor corrupt these rules; darestic private citizens must not only believe in the stability of this system, but also believe that other citizens also have that belief.
Foreign financial agents, when dealing with those of our country, must not expect to have these rules changed when things go wrong for them; foreign financial agents dealing within our econaey would presumably be subject to the same rules of the game as our financial agents.
Even arrong those who find a predaninantly laissez-faire financial system not only imaginable but also a desirable goal of policy, there are differences on how to organize the underlying nonetary system. Sare take for granted that the goverrment will have a nonopoly in the supply of, cash and coins. Aware of the macroeconanic instability which could be generated by sudden changes in the public preferences between cash and the derrand deposits supplied by banks subject to fractional reserves, as during the early 1930s in the United States, these observers would impose 100 percent reserves on banks supplying those deposits, while leaving the rest of the financial system unregulated. (See Friedman 1959) . In this view, a significant difference exists between m:>ney (cash plus demand deposits) and other financial assets.
Other observers would carry a laissez-faire_ policy even into cash, eliminating the goverrurent nonopoly, and leaving individual agents -5-free to choose anong all potential suppliers of cash, including foreign governrrents. In this approach there would be no need to inpose reserve requirements on banks, which would be totally free of government regulations. The noney supply would presumably adjust to real needs, while price and wage flexibility would maintain macroeconanic balance(see Ha.11,1982) .
The laissez-faire vision also has (at least) two variants regarding how the unregulated dcmestic econany should nan.age its exchange rate. If the country is large enough, those giving the governrrent a nonopoly over the noney supply advocate a freely fluctuating exchange rate, with no restrictions on international trade nor on capital flows.
If the country is small (with the borderline between large and small left fuzzy) , even m:>ney-rnonopolists favor sane f onn of fixed exchange rate system. For politically turbulent nations, a variant of the laissez-faire vision in small countries would do away with the local central bank, i.e.,_ no national could be trusted with the m:>ney nonopoly, which would be turned over to a presumably benign and responsible foreign goverrurent, as in the cases of Panama and Puerto Rico.
No industrial country has care close to the laissez-faire vision, at least since the 1930s. The government m:>nopoly over cash has been maintained, while banks have been regulated and subjected to fractional reserve requirements. In the United States, an explicit federal deposit insurance was introduced during the 1930s and maintained since then, eliminating old-fashioned "runs" on banks. Like any other insurance scheme, deposit insurance is vulnerable to noral hazard consequences, i.e., it induces depositors to think that "one bank is as good as another," and leads bank nana.gers to undertake riskier loans. American countries by fixed exchange rates, convertibility and price stability; darestic interest rates were closely linked to those in New York and wndon. Although there was no "financial repression," critics pointed out to a lack of ireditnn and long-tenn credit, particularly to finance industry and non-traditional agriculture. Dorrestic stock and lx>nd markets were small; only Argentina seems to have had a premising fonna.l clcm:stic financial market, daninated by nortgage paper. Authorities repeatedly warned the public that deposits were not guaranteed, and that financial intennediaries, like any other private firm, could go bankrupt; it was explicitly stated that there would not be a "bailing out" of banks and other financial interrrediaries.
During 1977 it becarre apparent that an important bank (the Banco Osorno) was in serious trouble. The authorities, fearing that its bankruptcy 'VYDuld tarnish external and internal confidence on Chilean financial institutions, intervened, and rescued depositors and the institution. Apparently, the fear that external loans would decrease if the Osorno were allCMed to go bankrupt was the crucial argurrent for intervention. Naturally, fresh warnings were issued that, fran then on, financial intenrediaries would not be rescued. At that stage practically no inspection '.Or supervision of bank portfolios existed. One may conjecture that after this event depositors felt, de facto, fully insured and foreign lenders felt that their loans to the private Chilean sector were, in fact, guaranteed by the state.
During 1979 the Chilean econanic authorities started a process expected to culminate in a pseudo-exchange-rate union with the United States (see Carden 1972) . The naninal exchange rate was fixed in July 1979, and restrictions over convertibility and capital novenents were relaxed; by 1981 those restrictions had been considerably weakened, and Chile witnessed a massive capital inflow. Presumably the hope was to make lending to Chile subject to no nore currency risk than lending to Puerto Rico or Panama; the naninal exchange rate was supposed to last "for many years." Sane of the econanic authorities dreamed with doing away with the national currency altogether, but feared that the military may not wish to go that far.
The theoretical underpirmings of these policies included an extrerre version of the nonetary approach to the balance of payrrents, plus the hypothesis that financial markets, darestic and international, were no different fran the market for apples and neat. Voluntary financial transactions between private agents were their own business, and presumably Pareto-optimal. Indeed, the nationality of those private agents was regarded as alrrost irrelevant. The then Director of the Western Hemisphere Division of the International MJnetary Fund put it this way at a neeting held in Santiago de Chile during January 1980: "In the case of the private sector, I would argue that the difference between darestic and foreign debt is not signif icant--barring goverrnrental interference with the transfer of service payments or other clearly inappropriate public policies--if it exists at all. The exchange risks associated with foreign borrowing are presurrably taken into account as are the other risks associated with borrowing, whether it be fran darestic or foreign sources. MJre generally, private f inns can be expected to be careful in assessing the net return to be derived fran borrCMed funds as canpared with the net cost since their survival as enterprises is at stake." (See Robichek 1981, p.171 ).
-11-
The sane author 'Went on to argue that overborrowing by the private sector, even with official guarantees, was very unlikely, provided official guarantees were given on a selective basis; only public borrowing on international financial markets was regarded as posing the more serious debt service risks (see Robichek 1981, p.172.) Convergence of darestic inflation and interest rates toward international ones proved to be a slow process, during which the fixed "pennanent" naninal exchange rate yielded great incentives for private capital inflows into Chile: during 1981 the current account deficit reached an astonishing 14 percent of Chilean Gross National Product, while darestic savings appeared to collapse. The process of financial liberation had also led to a widely noted concentration of potential econa:nic power in the hands of a few conglarerates or econcmic groups, which canbined financial and non-financial corporations. Before 1981, the official view seems to have been that those econcmic groups must reflect SOitE econcmies of scale, and could be regarded as one special type of butcher shop, disciplined by free entry and other competitive pressures. Their allocation of credit resources, often heavily loaded to canpanies associated with the group, was presurred to be more efficient than that which governrrent bureaucrats could achieve. Fund, 1983, p.118-119 ,lines 32 and 32d) .
By late 1981 and early 1982 Chile was also feeling the full force of the international econanic crisis, and discovering that it was not a "snall country" in international financial rrarkets, in the sense of being able to borrow, in either public or private account, all it wished at a given interest rate, even including a generous spread.
Pressures nounted on the already overvalued ncrninal exchange rate, fixed Whatever the merits of these charges and countercharges, it was clear that the dcnestic financial crisis in Chile had questioned not only the future of many existing banks and corporations but also the rules of the game as they had been understood during the years of the "Chilean miracle." The opaqueness of the intervention procedures, and of the announced processes to settle the tangled web of inter-conpany and bank debts even raised questions alx>ut the regim2's respect for property rights or at least its willingness to provide effective nechanisrns for the efficient exercise of those rights.
-14- Assuming that a country intends to maintain nonetary sovereignty but that significant, yet not explosive, inflationary expectations persist, there is a strong case for making sure that private agents have available a danestic liquid financial asset yielding a real interest rate which is not far belCM,nor Irn.lch above, zero. The inflationary tax borne by currency balances may result fran the inability of the fiscal system to find non-inflationary sources of revenues, or it may be simply a by-product of an inflationary spiral, whose inertial m:::menturn could only be halted by a severe real contraction. Presumably the transactions convenience provided by dorrestic currency will be enough to generate sane demand for it, even under m:xlerate inflation, an assumption supported by South Arrerican experiences. But without a liquid and safe store of value denaninated in darestic currency, which at least maintains its purchasing power, a national rronetary and financial system will have little long run credibility, short of draconian controls. It could also be argued that without such an asset the system would not :rreet the rrost elerrentary tests of social equity.
There are many possible ways to supply such an asset. The banking system, for example, could provide indexed savings accounts; depending on practical considerations,they could be used partly as checking accounts. At least that segment of the banking system would have explicit and full deposit insurance, perhaps only for accounts below a certain (generous) limit; insurance for larger accounts could be partial. Naturally, the use by banks of funds coming from those accounts would be tightly regulated by a flinty-eyed superintendency of banks. Indeed, practical considerations could lead to the requirerrent of 100 per cent reserves on that type of deposits, to be placed in very safe assets.
Enonrous potential power is given by this scherre to the regulatory agencies: it could end up in the total control of credit by the Central Bank. Experiences in I.a.tin America and elsewhere with a public rronopoly of credit have not been so encouraging as to rrake one indifferent to this possibility. Safeguards against the rronopoly scenario would include allowance for the supply of alternative financial assets, by either private agents or decentralized public ones, plus an active Congressional supervision of the regulatory agencies and the public -22-banks. The latter point suggests that demxracy, whatever its rrore fundalrental virtues, is an important technical input for a healthy darestic financial system.
Suppliers of riskier financial assets would not have available public deposit insurance but would be subject to less regulation. Nevertheless, these would still include m:ininuJm capital requirements, strict "transparency" info:ana.tional rules (regarding both assets and connections with other finns), and clear "risk-may-be-hazardous-for-your-health"
warnings to the general public. After recent experiences it is probably better to proceed cautiously in this segrrent of the darestic financial market, but not so cautiously as to make it an empty set. Interest rates offered and charged by these intencediaries would be expected to show significant real rates; at least on an experinental basis those rates would not be set by the nonetary authorities, but spreads between active and passive rates would be subject to antitrust vigilance (as entry into this sector would not be canpletely free). Those spreads would depend, inter alia, on possible official reserve requirenents; these could be presumed to be quite low for this segrrent of the market. 
